Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Okada, Akira
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 193-201
• 关键词: Decentralized market; many-to-one matching; Protocol-free equilibrium; Sequential bargaining; STABILITY

摘要

We consider a non-cooperative decentralized matching game as sequential bargaining. A protocol-free equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is robust to a choice of a bargaining protocol. We show that a matching is generated in a protocol-free equilibrium if and only if it is stable. The bargaining game can be applied to a wide class of matching problems including marriage problems, college admissions problems, matching with contracts, assignment games, and cooperative NTU games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.