Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sano, Ryuji
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 465-473
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; patience; Optimal mechanism; Multidimensional type

摘要

This study considers a mechanism design problem in which service slots are allocated over time to buyers arriving in different periods. Buyers have a multidimensional type representing their valuation and patience level. Some buyers can accept delayed service, whereas others cannot. The seller fully commits to a deterministic mechanism. We show that a mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if and only if the allocation rule is monotone in valuation and price equivalence holds. The dynamic pivot mechanism with reserve prices maximizes the seller's expected revenue if and only if the virtual valuation function is affine. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.