Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casella, Alessandra; Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren; Jiang, Michelle
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.012
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 133-155
• 关键词: Voting; turnout; Minority protection; Costly voting; laboratory experiments

摘要

Under majoritarian election systems, securing the participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is the adoption of Cumulative Voting (CV) in multi-member districts: each voter has as many votes as open positions but can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Historical experiences are promising but also reflect episodes of minority activism. We present the results of a controlled lab experiment that isolates the role of the voting rule from other confounds. Although each voter is treated equally, theory predicts that CV should increase the minority's turnout relative to the majority and the minority's share of seats won. The experimental results strongly support both theoretical predictions.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.