Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Xiang; Xu, Jin; Zhou, Junjie
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; Wuhan University; Shandong University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.013
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 978-991
• 关键词: Conflict network; neutrality; Curvature of contest technology

摘要

In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the aggregate actions and equilibrium payoffs under two regimes are the same. We also show that, in some sense, the Tullock form is necessary for such a neutrality result. Moving beyond the Tullock family, we further demonstrate how the curvature of contest technology shapes the welfare and effort effects.