Political power and the credibility of government debt
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dixit, A; Londregan, J
署名单位：
Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2684
发表日期：
2000
页码：
80-105
关键词：
摘要：
If political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups, then a self-selection equilibrium can arise where the government's promise to repay its debt is credible. We illustrate this using a formal model where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital. Classification Numbers: D72, E60, H63. (C) 2000 Academic Press.