Learning in games by random sampling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, JW; Mezzetti, C
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2694
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 55-84
• 关键词: Strategic games; bounded rationality; Nash equilibrium

摘要

We study repeated interactions among a fixed set of low rationality players who have status quo actions, randomly sample other actions, and change their status clue if the sampled action yields a higher payoff. This behavior generates a random process, the better-reply, dynamics. Long run behavior leads to Nash equilibrium in games with the weak-finite improvement property, including finite, super-modular games and generic, continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games. If players make mistakes and if several players can sample at the same time; the resulting better-reply dynamics with simultaneous sampling converges to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in common interest games. (C) 2001 Academic Press.