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作者：Adachi, H
作者单位：Toyo University
摘要：in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the...
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作者：Fang, HM; Parreiras, SO
作者单位：Yale University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper provides a class of examples of two-bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value. We show that the seller's expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy. The intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows. In the presence of financial constraints, the bidders' upward response in their bids to the seller's good s...
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作者：Wachter, JA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：As risk aversion approaches infinity, the portfolio of an investor with utility over consumption at time T is shown to converge to the portfolio consisting entirely of a bond maturing at time T. Previous work on bond allocation requires a specific model for equities, the term structure, and the investor's utility function. In contrast, the only substantive assumption required for the analysis in this paper is that markets are complete. The result, which holds regardless of the underlying inves...
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作者：Goeree, JK
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are above value. In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to sign...
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作者：Myatt, DP; Wallace, C
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori et al. (Econometrica 61 (1993) 29), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier l...
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作者：de Villemeur, EB; Versaevel, B
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; emlyon business school; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of ...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Renault, R
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of rho-concavity and rho-convexity. The more concave is demand, the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus, the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus, and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus. Deadweight loss...
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作者：Detemple, JB; Karatzas, I
作者单位：Boston University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We formulate a model of preferences with non-addictive habits, where consumption is required to be non-negative at all times, but can fall below a standard of living index that aggregates past consumption. We study the consumption-portfolio problem taking account of the non-negativity constraint on consumption, and provide a constructive proof for the existence of an optimal policy on a finite time-horizon [0, T]. We show that the consumption constraint binds up to an endogenous stopping time ...
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作者：Katzman, B; Kennan, J; Wallace, N
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Miami; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Monetary uncertainty and information lags are put into a random matching model so that the resulting setting has some meetings in which producers are relatively informed and others in which consumers are relatively informed. For that setting, the ex ante socially optimal way to conduct trade is characterized. The optimum can display a variety of relationships between money and total output and the price level. While the price level is always sticky, even the direction of its response and that ...
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作者：Cason, TN; Friedman, D
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We study markets with costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. Buyers costlessly observe one or (with probability 1-q) two of the posted prices, and can accept one or pay to search again. The experiment varies q, the search cost, and the number of buyers. Equilibrium theory predicts a unified very low (high) price for q = 0 (q = 1) and predicts specific distributions of dispersed prices for q = 1/3 and 2/3. Actual prices conform closely to the predictions in some treatm...
