From private to public common agency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Villemeur, EB; Versaevel, B
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; emlyon business school; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 305-309
• 关键词: Common agency; PRIVATE; Public; externalities

摘要

This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.