A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, DP; Wallace, C
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 286-301
• 关键词: multinomial probit; Stochastic evolution; idiosyncrasy; dominated strategies

摘要

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori et al. (Econometrica 61 (1993) 29), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier literature continue to apply. The distributional assumption enables a convenient closed form characterisation for the weights of the rooted trees. An illustration of the approach is offered, via a consideration of the role of dominated strategies in equilibrium selection. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.