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作者：Boucekkine, R; Licandro, O; Puch, LA; del Rio, F
作者单位：European University Institute; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Complutense University of Madrid; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：This paper analyzes the equilibrium dynamics of an AK-type endogenous growth model with vintage capital. The inclusion of vintage capital leads to oscillatory dynamics governed by replacement echoes, which additionally influence the intercept of the balanced growth path. These features, which are in sharp contrast to those from the standard AK model, can contribute to explaining the short-run deviations observed between investment and growth rates time series. To characterize the optimal solut...
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作者：Bassetto, M
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：How should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome? In this paper, I show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question, and I propose an alternative. I show that the complete description of an optimal (indeed, of any) policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected. The specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and whic...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Stachurski, J
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Kyoto University
摘要：The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster-Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hellwig, MF
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers' net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers' risks,...
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作者：Cho, IK
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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作者：Ghiglino, C
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bern
摘要：We explore the link between wealth inequality and stability in a two-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. We show that when the inverse of absolute risk aversion (or risk tolerance) is a strictly convex function, wealth inequality is a factor that favors instability. In the opposite case, inequality favors stability. Our characterization also shows that whenever absolute risk tolerance is linear, as when preferences exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), wealt...
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作者：Le Van, C; Vailakis, Y
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we propose a unifying approach to the study of recursive economic problems. Postulating an aggregator function as the fundamental expression of tastes, we explore conditions under which a utility function can be constructed. We also modify the usual dynamic programming arguments to include this class of models. We show that Bellman's equation still holds, so many results known for the additively separable case can be generalized for this general description of preferences. Our a...
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作者：Hoppe, HC; Lehmann-Grube, U
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Hamburg
摘要：We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advant...
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作者：Farmer, REA; Lahiri, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We study a class of utility functions that are defined recursively by an aggregator W (x, y) where u(t) = W (c(t), u(t+1)). In single-agent economies it is known that a sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is that utility should be homogenous of degree y. In the context of a multi-agent economy we show that this restriction implies that either a balanced growth equilibrium fails to exist or all agents have the same constant discount factor. We suggest a generalizati...
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作者：Barberà, S; Massó, J; Neme, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
