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作者：Chakraborty, A; Citanna, A
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment. Individuals can remain self-employed or engage in productive matches with another individual, i.e., form firms. Matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability. The division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces. When the incentive problem is asymmetric, matches are typically wealth-heterogeneous, with richer individuals choosing th...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. First, the auctioneers commit to some reserve prices; second, the bidders enter one auction, if any; and finally, the auctions take place. We show that for any finite set of feasible reserve prices, each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production cost if the numbers of auctioneers and bidders are sufficiently large, though finite. Our result supports the idea that optimal auctions may be quite simple. Our model al...
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作者：Hansen, LP; Sargent, TJ
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago
摘要：In a Markov decision problem with hidden state variables, a decision maker expresses fear that his model is misspecified by surrounding it with a set of alternatives that are nearby as measured by their expected log likelihood ratios (entropies). Sets of martingales represent alternative models. Within a two-player zero-sum game under commitment, a minimizing player chooses a martingale at time 0. Probability distributions that solve distorted filtering problems serve as state variables, much ...
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作者：Roth, AE; Sönmez, T; Ünver, MU
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Boston College; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient-donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 prefe...
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作者：Maniquet, F; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that individual welfare levels below the stand-alone lower bound (respectively, above the unanimity upper bound) should be increased (respectively, reduced). Combining either property with efficiency and ro...
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作者：Faig, M; Jerez, B
作者单位：University of Toronto; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：The theory of commerce advanced here captures prominent features of retail trade: large employment, congestion effects, anonymous posted prices, and quantity discounts. This theory is built around a directed search model where buyers' preferences are private information. The analytical solution is easily inserted in a Neoclassical growth framework. In this framework, the parameters of retail trade are calibrated using commercial margins and employment. Welfare properties depend on the sellers'...
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作者：Laraki, R; Solan, E; Vieille, N
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for each epsilon > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kelly, DL
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity sho...
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作者：Spear, SE; Wang, C
作者单位：Iowa State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever. This paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts. We modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which, upon the dissolution of the contract, allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match. Under this simple closure of the model, two types of terminations emerge. Under one scenario, th...
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作者：Benhabib, J; Carlstrom, CT; Fuerst, TS
作者单位：New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University
摘要：The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the Taylor Principle, under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and indeterminacy. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
