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作者：Leung, Sin Fai
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint, the consumer's wealth must be depleted before the maximum lifetime. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time. It is proved that the optimal terminal wealth depletion time, if such exists, must be unique. If the equation that determines the optimal terminal wealth depletion has multiple solutions, then the location of the optimal solution will depend o...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter; Schlag, Karl H.
作者单位：University of Exeter; European University Institute
摘要：It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, including all monotone regular selection dynamics, every asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy...
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作者：Peluso, Eugenio; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Verona; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly. Individuals are split into two types, those who receive more than one half of the family budget and those who receive less than one half. We look for conditions under which welfare and inequality quasi-orders established at the household level still hold at the individual one. A necessary and sufficient condition for the Gene...
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作者：Hellwig, Martin F.
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：The paper extends the Holmstrom-Milgrom [B. Holmstrom, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328] analysis of intertemporal incentive provision to allow for the implementation of actions on the boundary of the feasible set. Boundary actions provide the principal with some freedom in choosing incentive schemes. This can be used to reduce premia. The paper characterizes optimal incentive schemes for the continuous-time Brow...
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作者：Kartik, Navin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(l) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-145 1]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of AustenSmith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influent...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric i...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of N player repeated games with private, almost perfect monitoring. Our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata. Furthermore, we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent. Whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of N player games, our results are applicable to a...
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作者：Dana, Rose-Anne; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：University of Turin; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：This paper examines qualitative properties of efficient insurance contracts in the presence of background risk. In order to get results for all strictly risk-averse expected utility maximizers, the concept of stochastic increasingness is used. Different assumptions on the stochastic dependence between the insurable and uninsurable risk lead to different qualitative properties of the efficient contracts. The new results obtained under hypotheses of dependent risks are compared to classical resu...
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional...
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作者：Manellia, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points, and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize...
