Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 382-413
• 关键词: Repeated game; private monitoring; Belief-free equilibrium; review strategy; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of N player repeated games with private, almost perfect monitoring. Our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata. Furthermore, we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent. Whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of N player games, our results are applicable to a wide range of N player games of economic relevance, such as trading goods games and price-setting oligopolies. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.