A note on cheap talk and burned money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartik, Navin
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 749-758
• 关键词: Cheap talk; Money burning; signaling

摘要

Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(l) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-145 1]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of AustenSmith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.