Uncertainty, co-ordination and path dependence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 262-287
• 关键词: uncertainty; co-ordination; Path dependence

摘要

Our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co-ordination in a game with strategic complementarities. We study two dynamic aspects: different agents make decisions at different points in time; and extra information about a payoff-relevant state of nature becomes available over time. We find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium. This is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs. We also analyse how successfully agents co-ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that path dependence occurs: the order in which signals arrive matters, as well as the total amount of information received. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.