Veto-based delegation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mylovanov, Tymofiy
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 297-307
• 关键词: veto power; asymmetric information; principal-agent relationship; No monetary transfers; implementation; DELEGATION

摘要

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the veto-power principle: the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: to design the default outcome and to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.