Bidding for money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Julien, Benoit; Kennes, John; King, Ian
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney; Aarhus University; University of Otago; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.009
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 196-217
• 关键词: money; directed search; Multilateral matching

摘要

We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties. Crown Copyright (C) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.