Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; University of Warwick; University of London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 246-278
• 关键词: competitive pricing; clubs; Local public goods; hedonic coalitions; edgeworth; Tiebout hypothesis; core; decentralization

摘要

We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary-clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price-taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions take into account that there is a small communication cost of deviating from a given outcome. We demonstrate that, given communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies the core is nonempty and the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the core. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.