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作者：Wang, Pengfei; Wen, Yi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper shows imperfect competition can lead to indeterminacy in aggregate output in a standard DSGE model with imperfect competition. Indeterminacy arises in the model from the composition of aggregate output. In sharp contrast to the indeterminacy literature pioneered by Benhabib and Farmer [J. Benhabib, R. Farmer, Indeterminacy and increasing returns, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1) (1994) 19-41] and Gali [J. Gali, Monopolistic competition, business cycles, and the composition of aggregate demand...
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作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents' preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. We show that the presence of such preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practica...
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作者：Chatterjee, Satyajit; Corbae, Dean; Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Pennsylvania; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-fisk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to ...
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作者：Kosenok, Grigory; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：New Economic School; University of Essex
摘要：We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents' type profiles satisfies two conditions: the well-known condition of Cremer and McLean [1988. Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56, 1247-1257] and the Id...
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作者：Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Barbera and Bevia [Self-selection consistent functions, J. Econ. Theory 105 (2002) 263-277; Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation, Games Econ. Behav. 56 (2006) 185-200], we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive algorithm for efficient...
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作者：Ferraris, Leo; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper presents a microfounded model of money where durable assets serve as a guarantee to repay consumption loans. We study a steady state equilibrium where money and credit coexist. In such an equilibrium, a larger investment in durable capital relaxes the borrowing constraint faced by consumers. We show that the occurrence of over-investment and the behavior of capital accumulation depend on the rate of inflation, the relative fisk aversion of agents and the marginal productivity of the...
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作者：Saez-Marti, Maria; Sjogren, Anna
作者单位：University of Zurich; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We consider a task, demanding a sequence of efforts, that must be completed by a deadline. Effort is not contractible. Agents face shocks to their opportunity cost of time and are sometimes distracted from work. We show that agents who are often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. The reason is that anticipation of distractions induces agents to start earlier for precautionary reasons. Principals can increase the probability of completion, and achieve higher profits...
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作者：Spulber, Daniel F.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The international market for technology is growing rapidly relative to world GDP. To study the international technology market, I present a model of innovation and international trade in which inventors auction their technology in both domestic and foreign markets. There is monopolistic competition in differentiated products. International trade in technology has number of significant economic effects. Technology trade improves the quality of innovation by increasing the pool of R&D experiment...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Vienna
摘要：We consider a population of agents, either finite or countably infinite, located on an arbitrary network. Agents interact directly only with their immediate neighbors, but are able to observe the behavior of (some) other agents beyond their interaction neighborhood, and learn from that behavior by imitating successful actions. If interactions are not too global but information is fluid enough, we show that the efficient action is the only one which can spread contagiously to the whole populati...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Georgetown University; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Warwick; New York University
摘要：This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. They act as conduits for both transfers and information; affecting the scope for insurance and the severity of punishments upon noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable...
