-
作者：Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：In this paper I study mechanism design by an informed principal. I show that generically this problem has an ex-post efficient solution. In the equilibrium mechanism, the informed principal appropriates all expected social surplus, with each type of her getting all expected social surplus conditional on that type. This outcome is supported as a perfect sequential equilibrium of the informed principal game when the joint probability distribution from which the agents' types are drawn satisfies ...
-
作者：Mailath, George J.; Noeldeke, Georg
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Basel
摘要：We study market breakdown in a finance context under extreme adverse selection with and without competitive pricing. Adverse selection is extreme if for any price there are informed agent types with whom uninformed agents prefer not to trade. Market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We present a necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown. If the condition holds, then trade is not viable. If the condition fails, then trade can occur under competitive p...
-
作者：Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision maker is driven by anticipated ex post regrets. Our model allows both regret aversion and likelihood judgement over states to coexist. Also, we characterize two special cases, minimax regret with multiple priors that generalizes Savage's minimax regret, and a smooth model of regret aversion. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Miyagawa, Elichi; Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi
作者单位：Kyoto University; Kobe University; Kobe University
摘要：The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can buy precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not pay the cost, he obtains only imperfect private signals. Observational decisions are unobservable to others. Known strategies such as trigger s...
