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作者：Fujiki, Hiroshi; Green, Edward J.; Yamazaki, Akira
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Iryo Sosei University
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment,...
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作者：Madeira, Gabriel A.; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：We create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups, with good internal information, and their coexistence with relative performance, individualistic regimes, which are informationally more opaque. Inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously. Numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions. Regions of low inequality and mo...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Imhof, Lorens A.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235-265] and the related processes proposed by Benaim and Weibull [Determinist...
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作者：Davila, J.; Eeckhout, J.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：In a simple exchange economy we propose a bargaining procedure that leads to a Walrasian outcome as the agents become increasingly patient. The competitive outcome therefore obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. Our bargaining procedure involves bargaining over prices and ...
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作者：Funk, Peter
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：A perfectly competitive vintage-knowledge model of Schumpeterian growth is introduced to study the relation between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and productivity-dispersion. The incentive to innovate is generated by the productivity-dispersion (latent in traditional vintage models) between new and old plants, rather than by monopoly rents. The model has a unique steady-state REE with endogenous growth. The endogenous extent of entry constitutes a buffer, dampening the effect of research...
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作者：Siu, Henry E.
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria - one with low inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high in...
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作者：Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of Bonn; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Toronto
摘要：Two sellers decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a finite number of buyers with unit demand and privately known valuations. In the first model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers decide where to bid. Using the theory of potential games, we show that in the one-site auction model there is always an equilibrium in pure-strategies. In contrast, if t...
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作者：Chew, Soo Hong; Sagi, Jacob S.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We introduce the concept of a conditional small world event domain-an extension of Savage's [The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, New York, 1954] notion of a 'small world'-as a self-contained collection of comparable events. Under weak behavioral conditions we demonstrate probabilistic sophistication in any small world event domain without relying on monotonicity or continuity. Probabilistic sophistication within, though not necessarily across, small worlds provides a foundation for modeling ...
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作者：Cavalcanti, Ricardo de O.; Erosa, Andres
作者单位：University of Toronto; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study optimal allocations in an environment in which money is essential due to lack of commitment and anonymity of individuals. Because the economy features aggregate preference shocks, we apply a notion of implementability that allows for allocations with non-trivial business-cycle dynamics for the propagation of shocks. We show that history dependence is predicted by the theory of second best and becomes necessary for optimality when the degree of patience is neither too low nor too high....
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano
作者单位：Roma Tre University
摘要：In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform inefficiency, corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources [G. Debreu, The coefficient of resource utilization, Econometrica 19 (1951) 273-292]. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for uniform inefficiency in terms of prices at a competitive equilibrium: an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if the relative price of the aggregate endo...
