Informal insurance in social networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Warwick; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.008
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 36-58
• 关键词: Social networks; Reciprocity network; risk sharing; NORMS; informal insurance; Sparseness; Stable networks

摘要

This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. They act as conduits for both transfers and information; affecting the scope for insurance and the severity of punishments upon noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable networks as suitably sparse networks. Thickly and thinly connected networks tend to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability. Finally. we discuss the effect of discounting on stability. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.