Deadlines and distractions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saez-Marti, Maria; Sjogren, Anna
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 153-176
• 关键词: Deadlines; Time-consistency; Timing of effort; Optimal incentives

摘要

We consider a task, demanding a sequence of efforts, that must be completed by a deadline. Effort is not contractible. Agents face shocks to their opportunity cost of time and are sometimes distracted from work. We show that agents who are often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. The reason is that anticipation of distractions induces agents to start earlier for precautionary reasons. Principals can increase the probability of completion, and achieve higher profits, by strategically setting tight deadlines, provided that the deadlines can be extended with some positive probability. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.