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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：I characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus. The numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference. These expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation, perfectionism, context effects, and other phenomena. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.
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作者：Crutzen, Benoit S. Y.; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856-869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225-239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive ...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Bonn
摘要：A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal. We discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex-ante social welfare. We first show that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows. At random, one agent at a time is selected to acquire informat...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some ...
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作者：Bond, Philip; Gomes, Armando
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal-agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent's indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We identify a new source of allocational inefficiency across tasks: excessive concentration, and its cons...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We discuss the theory of gerrymandering-proof voting rules. Our approach is axiomatic. We show that, for votes over a binary set of alternatives, any rule that is unanimous, anonymous, and gerrymandering-proof must decide a social outcome as a function of the proportions of agents voting for each alternative, and must either be independent of this proportion, or be in one-to-one correspondence with the proportions. In an extended model in which the outcome of a vote at the district level can b...
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作者：Chiesa, Gabriella; Denicolo, Vincenzo
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is P...
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作者：Koulovatianos, Christos; Mirman, Leonard J.; Santugini, Marc
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Virginia; University of Vienna
摘要：We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the effect of risk generated by the planner's econometric activity on optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two sources of risk about future payoffs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty due to the anticipation of learning. The latter renders control and learning nonseparable. We present two sets of results in a learning environment. First, conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or de...
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作者：Forges, Francoise; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：University of Brescia; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Afriat proved the equivalence of a variant of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class of nonlinear, nonconvex budget sets. We thereby obtain testable implications of rational behavior for a wide class of economic environments, and a constructive method to derive individual preferences fro...
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作者：Kajii, Atsushi; Ui, Takashi
作者单位：Kyoto University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a tra...
