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作者：HERTEL, TW
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：The general equilibrium effects of a tariff in the presence of product differentiation, increasing returns to scale, and non-cooperative, static firm behavior are explored. Optimal markups are treated as endogenous. The subsequent 'procompetitive effects' of tariff reform are systematically related to the nature of the game played by firms. Furthermore, markups are not always increasing in the tariff. This depends on the entry assumptions, of which three are considered: no entry, entry, and do...
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作者：GRESIK, TA; NELSON, DR
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：Transfer prices are administered charges for intra-firm transfers of factors of production. For a multinational firm, transfer prices for international transfers provide the means to redistribute costs and increase global profits given variations in national tax and profit repatriation policies. Local regulation of a subsidiary may thus be necessary to limit the welfare costs of strategic transfer pricing. Prusa (Journal of International Economics, 1990, 28, 155-172) characterizes the welfare-...
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作者：VELASCO, A
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作者：QIU, LD
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bert...
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作者：DUMAS, B; SVENSSON, LEO
作者单位：Stockholm University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We examine the expected survival time of a unilateral exchange rate target zone, when constraints on monetary policy prevent the central bank from exclusively focusing on defending the target zone. Generally the width of the target zone has a negligible effect on the expected survival time, and the dominant determinants are reserve levels and the degree of real and monetary divergence between the country in question and the rest of the world. For seemingly realistic parameters, the expected su...
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作者：DIXIT, A; ROB, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University
摘要：We consider a dynamic model of labor mobility in a small open economy with stochastic terms of trade. Migration is costly and markets for labor income risk are absent. Risk-aversion slows down the movement of the most productive workers into the risky sector, and speeds up that of the least productive ones. The effect of tariffs and autarky on risk-bearing is examined. A given policy may improve social welfare for some initial conditions and lower it for others. Thus policy design for such an ...
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作者：HEAD, K
摘要：This paper examines a particular instance of infant industry protection: the case of the U.S. steel rail industry. It analyzes the joint roles of learning-by-doing, changing resource endowments, and tariff protection in the emergence of this industry. Making use of estimated demand and cost parameters, the paper simulates what would have happened to prices, production, and welfare under free trade. I calculate that, despite strong learning effects, the steel rail tariff hurt rail users in both...
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作者：MALUEG, DA; SCHWARTZ, M
作者单位：Georgetown University; Tulane University
摘要：Parallel imports, goods imported by unauthorized resellers, are advocated world-wide for undermining international price discrimination. For a continuum of markets, we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third-degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is 'large': though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation, too many markets go unserved. Mixed systems, permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets, yiel...
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作者：COLLIE, D; HVIID, M
摘要：When the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market, the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand. In the signalling equilibrium, the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information. However, it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand. Th...
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作者：SRIVASTAVA, P
摘要：The credibility problem in trade liberalization has been studied in terms of asymmetric information between government and the private sector with resolution through reputational or signaling equilibria. This paper, in contrast, recognizes the genuine time-inconsistency problem with trade liberalization in countries where institutional underdevelopment implies tariffs are the major source of revenues. The welfare implications of the resulting credibility problem are analyzed. It is further sho...
