PARALLEL IMPORTS, DEMAND DISPERSION, AND INTERNATIONAL PRICE-DISCRIMINATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MALUEG, DA; SCHWARTZ, M
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90044-2
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 167-195
• 关键词: Parallel imports; INTERNATIONAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

摘要

Parallel imports, goods imported by unauthorized resellers, are advocated world-wide for undermining international price discrimination. For a continuum of markets, we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third-degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is 'large': though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation, too many markets go unserved. Mixed systems, permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets, yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing or unrestricted multimarket discrimination, and can Pareto dominate uniform pricing. Thus, while parallel imports might benefit some countries, our results weaken the (multilateral) case for allowing them.