OPTIMAL STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: QIU, LD
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 333-354
• 关键词: strategic trade policy; ASSYMMETRIC INFORMATION

摘要

When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.