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作者：Marimon, Ramon; Quadrini, Vincenzo
作者单位：University of Southern California; Pompeu Fabra University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of 'skilled workers' and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive ...
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作者：Hara, Chiaki; Huang, James; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Kyoto University; Lancaster University; Northwestern University
摘要：We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on an individual's expected utility function under which any zero-mean idiosyncratic risk increases cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion), which is the key determinant for this individual's demand for options and portfolio insurance. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Wang, Cheng
作者单位：Iowa State University; Fudan University
摘要：In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respe...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic in the context of social choice, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. We propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets of alternatives (set-rationalizability) and introduce two consistency conditions, (alpha) over bar and (gamma)over bar>, which are defined in analogy to Sen's alpha and gamma. We find that a choice functio...
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作者：Dziuda, Wioletta
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However, the decision maker is not influenced by the unfavorable arguments revealed by the biased expert. The...
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作者：Franke, Guenter; Schlesinger, Harris; Stapleton, Richard C.
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Manchester
摘要：We examine the effects of background risks on optimal portfolio choice. Examples of background risks include uncertain labor income, uncertainty about the terminal value of fixed assets such as housing and uncertainty about future tax liabilities. While some of these risks are additive and have been amply studied, others are multiplicative in nature and have received far less attention. The simultaneous effect of both additive and multiplicative risks has hitherto not received attention and ca...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Soenmez, Tayfun
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Boston College
摘要：We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sonmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We generalize the results of Homer and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Novinski, Rodrigo; Pascoa, Mario R.
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Wary consumers overlook gains but not losses in remote sets of dates or states. As preferences are upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous, Bewley's (1972) [4] result on existence of equilibrium whose prices are not necessarily countably additive holds. Wariness is related to lack of myopia and to ambiguity aversion (and, therefore, to Bewley's (1986) [6] work on Knightian uncertainty). Wary infinite lived agents have weaker transversality conditions allowing them to be creditors at infinit...
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作者：Strzalecki, Tomasz; Werner, Jan
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using t...
