Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoerner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1770-1795
• 关键词: Repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria

摘要

We generalize the results of Homer and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.