Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marimon, Ramon; Quadrini, Vincenzo
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Pompeu Fabra University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.01.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 976-1008
• 关键词: Contract enforcement; Barriers to competition; human capital; Economic growth

摘要

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of 'skilled workers' and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.