Strategic argumentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dziuda, Wioletta
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1362-1397
• 关键词: Strategic communication; persuasion; Argumentation; expert advice; Disclosure games; Two-sided messages

摘要

I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However, the decision maker is not influenced by the unfavorable arguments revealed by the biased expert. The latter is able to convince the decision maker to choose the biased expert's preferred alternative only if he reveals sufficiently many favorable arguments. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.