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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics of the stationary distribution do not depend on the order in which the mutation rate and population si...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We consider a signaling model where the sender's continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multipl...
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作者：Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper studies pricing patterns in a speculative market with asymmetric information populated by both sophisticated and naive traders. Three pricing regimes arise in equilibrium: perfect pricing, with prices equalling asset values, partial mispricing and complete mispricing. Perfect pricing obtains when the presence of naive traders is small although not necessarily zero. When the fraction of naive traders is moderate prices are correct for some values but not for others. Finally, complete...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando; Veracierto, Marcelo
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We develop a theoretical model of firm dynamics and unemployment and characterize equilibria with tenure dependent separation taxes. The model is a version of the Lucas and Prescott island model with undirected search. Two equivalent decentralizations are considered: one with spot labor markets and one with long-term employment relations. We model temporary contracts as the special case of a separation tax that only applies to workers with tenure higher than J. While in principle these contrac...
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作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Currarini, Sergio; Jackson, Matthew O.; Pin, Paolo; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：Stanford University; Laval University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Bristol; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Siena; Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We model network formation when heterogeneous nodes enter sequentially and form connections through both random meetings and network-based search, but with type-dependent biases. We show that there is long-run integration, whereby the composition of types in sufficiently old nodes' neighborhoods approaches the global type-distribution, provided that the network-based search is unbiased. However, younger nodes' connections still reflect the biased meetings process. We derive the type-based degr...
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作者：Lauermann, Stephan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyer's valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation (asymmetric information), bilateral trade is inefficient. This bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market. In the steady-state equilibrium of the market game, the relation between the informa...
