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作者：Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study the market implications of ambiguity in common models. We show that generic determinacy is a robust feature in general equilibrium models that allow a distinction between ambiguity and risk. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can...
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作者：Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study problems where each person initially owns an object and every object is owned. For such problems, when preferences are strict, the top trading cycles algorithm provides the only rule that is efficient, strat...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a rational ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice di...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We consider a bank runs model a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the...
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作者：Duggan, John; Kalandrakis, Tasos
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks. We prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere. We...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically independent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufficient condition for the existence of asymptotically efficient equilibria, and establish a folk theorem for N-player pris...
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作者：Bester, Helmut; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn; Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple deterministic exit option contract, which allows the buyer to refuse trade, achieves the first-best in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer's valuation is public information. But, when unverifiable and...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Heo, Eun Jeong
作者单位：University of Rochester; Rice University
摘要：We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which take the ordinal preferences as input. We characterize the serial rule, proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) [2]: it is the only rule satisfying sd efficiency, sd no-envy, and bounded invariance. A special representation of feasible assignment matrices by mean...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Martimort, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates optimal mechanisms in a principal agent framework with a two-dimensional decision space, quadratic payoffs and no monetary transfers. If the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, then delegation is always strictly valuable. The principal can better extract information from the agent by using the spread between the two decisions as a costly screening device. Delegation sets no longer trade off pooling intervals and int...
