Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lauermann, Stephan
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.021
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1969-1997
• 关键词: Dynamic matching and bargaining games; decentralized markets; Consumer privacy; search frictions; asymmetric information

摘要

I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyer's valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation (asymmetric information), bilateral trade is inefficient. This bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market. In the steady-state equilibrium of the market game, the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted: With small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric. If information is symmetric, however, the trading outcome can be very inefficient-even if frictions vanish. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.