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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Bonn
摘要：We characterize the incentive compatible, constrained efficient policy (second-best) in a dynamic matching environment, where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents' values. We also derive conditions on the learning process ensuring that the complete-information, dynamically efficient allocation of resources (first-best) is incentive compatible. Our analysis reveals and exploits close, formal relations bet...
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作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Gottlieb, Daniel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University
摘要：This paper considers the problem of a risk-neutral firm offering a gamble to consumers with preferences given by prospect theory. Under conditions satisfied by virtually all functional forms used in the literature, firms can extract arbitrarily high expected values from consumers. Moreover, for any given lottery, there exists another lottery that makes both the firm and the consumer better off. As a consequence, equilibria and Pareto optimal allocations do not exist in standard monopolistic or...
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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer. We prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a Rubinstein-type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belon...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the diffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy, where agents learn from the actions of others through two channels: a public channel, such as equilibrium market prices, and a private channel, for example local interactions. We show that, when agents learn only from the public channel, an initial release of public information increases agents' total knowledge at all times and increases welfare. When a private learning channel is present, this result is reversed: more...
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作者：Cetorelli, Nicola; Peretto, Pietro F.
作者单位：Duke University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the conflicting evidence emerging from the recent empirical studies of the effects of bank competition on economic growth. We obtain them developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model of capital accumulation whe...
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作者：Goldluecke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Makarov, Igor; Rytchkov, Oleg
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study the properties of rational expectation equilibria (REE) in dynamic asset pricing models with heterogeneously informed agents. We show that under mild conditions the state space of such models in REE can be infinite dimensional. This result indicates that the domain of analytically tractable dynamic models with asymmetric information is severely restricted. We also demonstrate that even though the serial correlation of returns is predominantly determined by the dynamics of stochastic e...
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作者：Dybvig, Philip H.; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Oliver Hart proved the impossibility of deriving general comparative static properties in portfolio weights. Instead, we derive new comparative statics for the distribution of payoffs: A is less risk averse than B iff A's payoff is always distributed as B's payoff plus a non-negative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise. If either agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the non-negative part can be chosen to be constant. The main result also holds in some incomplete markets...
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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Stanford University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper provides a mathematical foundation for independent random matching of a large population, as widely used in the economics literature. We consider both static and dynamic systems with random mutation, partial matching arising from search, and type changes induced by matching. Under independence assumptions at each randomization step, we show that there is an almost-sure constant cross-sectional distribution of types in a large population, and moreover that the multi-period cross-sect...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Feldman, Michal; Nisan, Noam; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Microsoft; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agents' actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends stochastically on the complex combinations of the efforts by the agents. The principal seeks the mechanism that maximizes the principal's net revenue given an equilibrium behavior of the agents. We investigate the...
