-
作者：Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions, exchange money with each other, and perfectly coordinate their actions. Our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results (such as those of Green and Laffont, and of Sc...
-
作者：Gill, David; Sgroi, Daniel
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed. Price flexibility boosts the positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the negative impact of failing a soft test. As a result, profits are convex in toughness: the firm selects either the toughest or softest test available. The toughest test is optimal when consumers start with an unfavorable prior and rece...
-
作者：Jacquet, Nicolas L.; Tan, Serene
作者单位：University of Adelaide; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisf...
-
作者：Christensen, Peter Ove; Larsen, Kasper; Munk, Claus
作者单位：Aarhus University; Carnegie Mellon University; Aarhus University
摘要：In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and unspanned income risk. In equilibrium, the Shame ratio is the same as in an otherwise identical complete market economy, whereas the risk-free rate is lower and, consequently, the stock price is higher....
-
作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：I apply mechanism design to quantify the cost of inflation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone. In an environment with pairwise meetings, the money demand that is consistent with an optimal, incentive feasible allocation takes the form of a continuous correspondence that can fit the data over the period 1900-2006. For such parameterizations, the cost of moderate inflation is zero. This result is robust to the introduction of match-specific heterogeneity and endogenous participat...
-
作者：Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009)[10]. The equivalence follows because the framework of Myerson (1982) [5] allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers. The literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optim...
-
作者：Okada, Daijiro; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We show that local potential maximizer (Morris and Ui (2005) [14]), a generalization of potential maximizer, is stochastically stable in the log-linear dynamic if the payoff functions are, or the associated local potential is, supermodular. Thus an equilibrium selection result similar to those on robustness to incomplete information (Morris and Ui (2005) [14]), and on perfect foresight dynamic (Oyama et al. (2008) [18]) holds for the log-linear dynamic. An example shows that stochastic stabili...
