Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldluecke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1191-1221
• 关键词: Repeated games; computational methods; Monetary transfers; Imperfect public monitoring

摘要

This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.