Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Okada, Akira
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1165-1190
• 关键词: Core; exchange economy; incomplete information; information transmission; non-cooperative bargaining; signaling

摘要

In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer. We prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a Rubinstein-type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self-selection property. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.