A note on Peters and Severinov, Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 389-392
• 关键词: Competing auctions; directed search

摘要

We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.