A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Korpela, Ville
• 署名单位: University of Turku
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2183-2193
• 关键词: Implementation; Matching rule; Sufficient condition; Strong equilibrium

摘要

In an important step forward Maskin [E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38] showed that two properties - monotonicity and no veto power - are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this characterization has two major advantages: First, it is often easy to verify, and second, it has an elegant and simple interpretation. However, there does not exist a similar condition for social choice correspondences that are implementable in strong equilibrium. All existing characterizations are either hard to verify or apply only to comprehensive preference domains. In this paper we improve the situation by giving one such condition. Moreover, using well-known examples we show that this is a practical tool. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.