Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1891-1928
• 关键词: Repeated game; Almost-public monitoring; private monitoring; Belief-free equilibrium; Global game; Robustness

摘要

Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a regular 2 x 2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.