Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Qingmin
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 49-75
• 关键词: Correlation; common prior; correlated equilibrium; Interim rationalizability; Redundant types

摘要

This paper provides an explicit characterization of correlations that are implicitly captured by partition models for incomplete information games. The main result of this paper shows that every partition model for incomplete information can be decomposed into the conjunctions of a unique non-redundant model and a unique individually uninformative correlating device. The separation of the correlating device from the underlying non-redundant model allows us to separate their strategic implications. As an application, we use this correlation device to define correlated equilibria. Separating the common-prior property of the correlating devices from the underlying state space sheds light on the difference between interim independent and correlated rationalizability. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.