TRANSFER PRICING RECONSIDERED
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
RONEN, J
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90008-4
发表日期：
1992
页码：
125-136
关键词：
摘要：
This paper revisits the transfer pricing scheme proposed by J. Ronen in 1974 (Journal of Public Economics 3, 71-82) and the controversy it gave rise to (T. Groves and M. Loeb, Journal of Public Economics 5, 353 359). The latter suggested that through centralized decisions on commodity transfers, problems they point out in Ronen's decenralized scheme could be alleviated. I establish here that under the Ronen scheme, decentralized divisions within a firm or firms which exchange externalities within an economy will indeed communicate truthful information unless the divisions or the firms were to coordinate their messages. If coordination were to be ruled out, truth-telling would almost always prevail. Further, with a slight feasible modification of the scheme, efficient production and truth-telling become a unique equilibrium. This is accomplished without having to centralize decisions within the center.
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