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作者：Alesina, A; Wacziarg, R
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. These empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up, and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
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作者：Besley, TJ; Rosen, HS
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Princeton University
摘要：A common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property. Consequently, state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent. Our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes. For example, a 10-cent per gallon increase in the...
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作者：Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Institut Universitaire de France; University of Liege
摘要：This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between two countries choosing their respective systems of social insurance in a context of labor mobility. It considers a class of social insurance systems which includes two interesting polar cases: one where benefits are linked to contributions (Bismarck) and one where benefits are flat (Beveridge). The type of social insurance is chosen behind the veil of ignorance at a first (constitutional) stage. In the second s...
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作者：Drèze, J
作者单位：Delhi School of Economics
摘要：When the unweighted sum of net benefits from a project are used as a criterion of project evaluation, cost-benefit analysis may be sensitive to the choice of numeraire. This is one reason, among others, why this criterion should not be used. There is no plausible alternative to the use of distributional weights. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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作者：Johansson, PO
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Brekke [Brekke (1997) Journal of Public Economics 64, 117-123] claims that using money as the numeraire in cost-benefit analysis is systematically favourable to those who value money the least, relative to alternative numeraires. This note attempts to show that the outcome of a properly undertaken cost-benefit analysis is independent of the choice of numeraire. However, since the marginal social utility of income (or, say, an environmental good) is unobservable, one faces a formidable problem ...
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作者：Strumpf, KS
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：It is well established that lump-sum public grants boost local government spending more than an equivalent increase in private income, the flypaper effect. One shortcoming of the related literature is that it presumes all communities have an identical propensity to consume from an intergovernmental grant. This paper is one attempt to allow for a heterogeneous response. The working conjecture is that government expenditure on administrative overhead is a gauge of voter control over fiscal decis...
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作者：Brekke, KA
作者单位：Statistics Norway; University of Oslo
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作者：Matsumura, T
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal un...
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作者：Weichenrieder, AJ
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
摘要：The paper considers investment incentives in corporate tax systems which grant an imputation credit to shareholders when dividends are distributed from domestic sources. An increase in the dividend tax rate which is induced by lowering the shareholders' imputation rate is shown to potentially depress domestic investment. This result is common to 'old view' models which assume that new equity is the marginal source of firms' finance. In this paper, however, the result is derived in a tax capita...
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作者：Roemer, JE
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We consider a political economy with two partisan parties; each party represents a given constituency of voters. If one party (Labour) represents poor voters and the other (Christian Democrats) rich voters, if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue, and if there are no incentive considerations, then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity. If, however, there are two issues - tax policy and religion, for instance then this is not generally the case...
