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作者：Naegelen, F; Mougeot, M
作者单位：Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
摘要：Discriminating in favor of domestic suppliers in the award of government procurement contracts is a widespread practice. In this paper, we extend the previous analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) [Government procurement and international trade. Journal of International Economics 26, 291-308] and Branco (1994) [Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts. Journal of International Economics 37, 65-80] by considering in the same model the bidding competition stimulation effect and the favo...
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作者：Devereux, MP; Griffith, R
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Keele University
摘要：This paper considers the factors that influence the locational decisions of multinational firms. A model in which firms produce differentiated products in imperfectly competitive markets is developed, in the spirit of Horstmann and Markusen (1992). Firms choose between a number of foreign locations; the outside options of exporting to or not serving the foreign market an explicitly modelled. Particular attention is paid to the impact of profit taxes, the separate roles of effective average and...
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作者：Quiggin, J; Chambers, RG
作者单位：James Cook University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Two basic representations of principal-agent relationships, the 'state-space' and 'parameterized distribution' formulations, have emerged. Although the state-space formulation appears more natural, analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success. This paper develops a state-space formulation of the moral-hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty. A closed-form solution for the agency-cost problem is derived. Comparative-static results are ...
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作者：Cremer, H; Gahvari, F; Ladoux, N
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second-best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private...
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作者：Somanathan, R
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of heterogeneity in school quality on high school wages, college enrolment rates and social surplus. Greater heterogeneity in school quality, combined with pooling on the labor market for high school graduates, is shown to result in lower average high school wages, inefficient college-going decisions, and, in some cases, lower social surplus. These effects of heterogeneity tend to be reinforced by technical change which raises the return to human capital. Techni...
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作者：Crain, WM; Crain, NV
作者单位：George Mason University; Shenandoah University
摘要：Governments have two main choices for a budgetary baseline procedure: the dollars spent the year before, or the level of services that those dollars bought which is labelled a current services baseline. This paper analyzes the effects of different baselines on fiscal policy. first by developing a conceptual framework and then by examining American state data to compare government spending patterns under alternative baseline rules. Controlling for a host of institutional, economic, and demograp...
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作者：Strawczynski, M
作者单位：Bank of Israel
摘要：This paper calculates optimal linear income taxes when differences in income are caused by random factors ('luck') rather than by unobserved individual skills, as assumed in the classical theory of income taxation. As first shown by Varian (1980) [Varian, H.R., 1980. Redistributive taxation as social insurance, Journal of Public Economics 14, 49-68] in the former case income taxation acts as social insurance. By introducing life uncertainty and precautionary behavior, we find higher optimal ma...
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作者：Warneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper explores the endogenous formation of jurisdictions, assuming the political process is a costly fight to acquire shares of the GNP pie. In such a setting, the stability of a unified jurisdiction is not necessarily determined by the preferences of the richest member region. We also show that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict. Less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical sys...
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作者：Bucovetsky, S
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：What causes a group of countries to agree to form a federation? Other alternative arrangements, which often an chosen instead, are to form a unitary state or to remain autonomous. Federations usually allow for considerable freedom of movement among constituent regions. They also provide a fairly limited redistribution of any rents earned in these regions. These two features together imply that residents of poor regions can share in the rents in rich regions by migration. This fiscal migration ...
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作者：Brett, C
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：Traditional analysis of tax reform treats market behaviour as arising out of individual utility maximisation. In this paper, behaviour is modelled as the Pareto-efficient outcome of a family decision process. Conditions for the existence of a feasible, Pareto-improving tax change are presented and contrasted with those that obtain in the individualistic case. The consequences of treating households as a single individual are also discussed. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
