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作者：Gradstein, M
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Assuming a world with excessive taxes, the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes. In particular, it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases, as currently used in some US states, is the means of attaining this objective. Their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries, that of franchise restrictions, is discussed. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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作者：Huber, B
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：The paper uses the self-selection approach of Stiglitz (1982) to study tax competition and tax coordination in a many country-optimum income tax model. In the model, the government can impose a non-linear tax schedule on wage income and a (source-based) tax on mobile capital. In an uncoordinated equilibrium, it turns out that countries can use the capital tax instrument to weaken the self-selection constraint. The paper presents examples where positive and negative capital taxes are optimal fr...
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作者：Small, KA
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：When a firm or public enterprise prices output at marginal cost, its profits are related to the degree of local scale economies in its cost function. I show that contrary to common belief, this result holds even when scale economies are affected by a rising factor supply curve. Thus marginal-cost pricing may be profitable even with constant returns to scale. Examples are provided for a monopsonist both with and without price discrimination, and for a case such as highways where congestion-pron...
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作者：Lansing, KJ
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
摘要：This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists' utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents' optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of re...
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作者：Livernois, J; McKennna, CJ
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：Evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalties for noncompliance are low. We offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self-reporting requirement and enforcement power. These extensions are enough to challenge the conventional result that higher fines lead to higher compliance rates. We find that under plausible conditions, higher compliance rates are ach...
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作者：Fredriksson, P
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：What are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs (ALMPs) have to please the employed majority? This issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. It turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of ALMPs and the political weight attributed to firm interests. If firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure, the employed will ...
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作者：Klein, P
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper develops a general equilibrium model of asset pricing when capital gains an taxed upon realization. Under realistic assumptions, capital gain lock-in is shown to depress the pre-tax returns of securities with accrued capital gains. This result implies slowly dissipating security return reversal, and may help explain empirical findings in the financial economics literature. As in the existing public finance literature, this paper shows that one's own accrued capital gains and investm...
