The political economy of public employment programs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fredriksson, P
• 署名单位: Uppsala University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00010-9
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 487-504
• 关键词: Political economy; active labor market programs; EFFICIENCY

摘要

What are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs (ALMPs) have to please the employed majority? This issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. It turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of ALMPs and the political weight attributed to firm interests. If firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure, the employed will opt for excessive program activity. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.