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作者：Rondeau, D; Schulze, WD; Poe, GL
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：A one-shot provision point mechanism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate of excess contributions is tested in an induced value framework. and in experimental environments chosen to mimic field conditions. The results show that this relatively simple mechanism is empirically demand revealing in the aggregate when used with large groups of students who have heterogenous valuations for the public good. Approximately demand revealing behavior was obtained under three alternative info...
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作者：Goulder, LH; Parry, IWH; Williams, RC; Burtraw, D
作者单位：Stanford University; Resources for the Future; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the significance of pre-existing factor taxes for the costs of pollution reduction under a wide range of environmental policy instruments. Pre-existing taxes imply significantly higher abatement costs for every instrument considered, but the cost-impact of such taxes differs sharply across instruments. Prior taxes can eliminate the cost-advantage of market-based instruments (emissions taxes and permits) over tech...
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作者：Heyes, A; Rickman, N
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Surrey
摘要：Despite the fact that (i) when the EPA observes regulatory violations it rarely pursues the violator and, (ii) the expected penalty faced by a violator who is pursued is small compared to the cost of compliance, it is still the case that, (iii), firms comply a significant portion of the time. Winston Harrington (Harrington, W., 1988. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics 37, 29-53) provides a dynamic model consistent with this apparent paradox. We offe...
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作者：Cutler, DM; Elmendorf, DW; Zeckhauser, R
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Harvard University
摘要：Proposition 2 1/2, a ballot initiative passed in Massachusetts in 1980, sharply reduced local property taxes. We examine why voters supported Proposition 2 1/2, using data on votes for the Proposition and for overrides of it a decade later. We find two reasons for the Proposition's support: people perceived agency losses from the difficulty of monitoring government, and people judged government to be inefficient because their tax burden was high. By the 1990s, people either regretted the sever...
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作者：Desai, MA; Hines, JR
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the impact of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) on international joint ventures by American firms. The TRA mandates the use of separate baskets in calculating foreign tax credits on dividends received from each foreign corporation owned 50% or less by Americans - which greatly reduces the attractiveness of joint ventures, especially those in low-tax foreign countries. Since the effect of the TRA on joint ventures varies with foreign tax rates, the country-level pattern ...
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作者：Beetsma, RMWJ; Bovenberg, AL
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University
摘要：If discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias, monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt. The additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic. In the presence of myopic governments, debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative, independent central bank to focus on price stability. With supply shocks, monetary unification results in excessive variabi...
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作者：Dharmapala, D
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes, comparing a 'tax committee' (enacting tax expenditures) and a decentralized system of specialized committees (undertaking direct spending). An endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting. The main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives rise to lower subsidy levels under a wide range of circumstances. However, it is only under a m...
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作者：Brunello, G; Ishikawa, T
作者单位：University of Padua; University of Tokyo
摘要：We present a model where the interaction between the size of the elite school sector, industrial structure and labor market outcomes is characterized by the concept of Nash decentralized equilibrium. Depending on the underlying parameters, the economy described in the model can be characterized by multiple regime equilibria and historical accident decides which equilibrium the economy falls in. In one regime, the size of the elite school sector affects investment in academic skills, average pr...
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作者：Huizinga, H
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：This paper first considers a closed economy consisting of two regions and inhabited by workers of heterogeneous productivity. Each region in principle can redistribute income among its workers. Workers are free to migrate between the two regions. If the two regions differ in their extent of income redistribution, there generally are two types of worker allocation equilibria: equilibria where the two national distributions of labor productivity overlap, and equilibria where labor is stratified ...
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作者：Hindriks, J; Keen, M; Muthoo, A
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Exeter; International Monetary Fund; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power - and the possibility thereof - are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes. Amongst the findings are that: the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice; ...
