Corruption, extortion and evasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hindriks, J; Keen, M; Muthoo, A
• 署名单位: University of Essex; University of Exeter; International Monetary Fund; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00030-4
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 395-430
• 关键词: corruption; Tax evasion; extortion; tax administration; collusion; mechanism design

摘要

Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power - and the possibility thereof - are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes. Amongst the findings are that: the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice; and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports (but not on low), with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be a previously-unnoticed trade-off between equity and efficiency. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.