Elite schools, high tech jobs and economic welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brunello, G; Ishikawa, T
• 署名单位: University of Padua; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00102-9
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 395-419
• 关键词: admission rules; returns to schooling; high tech jobs

摘要

We present a model where the interaction between the size of the elite school sector, industrial structure and labor market outcomes is characterized by the concept of Nash decentralized equilibrium. Depending on the underlying parameters, the economy described in the model can be characterized by multiple regime equilibria and historical accident decides which equilibrium the economy falls in. In one regime, the size of the elite school sector affects investment in academic skills, average productivity and wages. In another regime, elite schools do not matter for productivity and wages. Government policy that tries to shift the economy from the latter to the former regime cannot succeed unless there is a regime shift in the hiring policies of firms, from the reliance upon experienced workers to the emphasis on hiring school graduates from elite schools. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.